The Human Face of Resource Conflict:

Property and Power in Nigeria

KAROL C. BOUDREAUX*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

...................................................
INTRODUCTION
A.
The Outline of the Crisis........................................................................

II.

THE PROPERTY ENVIRONMENT: PROPERTY IN LAND AND
LAND TENURE INN IGERIA ...................................................................................

A.
B.
C.

Customary Land Law ............................................................................
PropertyNorms in Northern Nigeria....................................................
TheLand UseActofl978 ....................................................................

62
63

71
71
77
83

III.

BLOCKING THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY NORMS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM ......................................................................

IV .

10 1
C ON CLU SION ........................................................................

89

* Senior Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University. I would like to
thank the following individuals for their helpful comments: Paul Dragos Aligica, Peter
Boettke, Donald Boudreaux, Paul Edwards, Brian Hooks, John Paden, Russell Roberts,
and Frederic Sautet. My thanks also to the participants of the Mercatus Center's
Graduate Workshop and also to Josh Hill for helpful research assistance. Responsibility
for errors is mine alone.

I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental purpose of property rights, and their fundamental accomplishment,
is that they eliminate destructive competition for control of economic resources.
Well-defined and well-protected property
rights replace competition by violence
1
with competition by peaceful means.

Three years: 53,000 people dead, thousands of homes destroyed, tens
of thousands of men, women, and children displaced.2 These terrible
statistics do not represent the toll taken in a traditional war between
nations. Nor are they the result of a civil war. Rather, these grim figures
represent the outcome of a particular kind of conflict that surfaces all too
often in Africa and throughout the developing world: a bloody battle
over the use and control of resources, a battle that ultimately is about
property rights.
Between 2001 and 2004, the people of the central Nigerian state of
Plateau suffered a series of deadly riots that led to the declaration of a
state of emergency.3 What caused these riots? A peace conference
conducted by the Nigerian government blamed the violence on disputes
over property---disputes that were, undoubtedly, exacerbated by ethnic
and religious conflicts. 4 The scope of the killing is shocking and leads
one to ask, "What has happened in Nigeria to drive people to settle land
disputes by means of violence rather than peaceful judicial, administrative,
or customary mechanisms?"
This paper considers possible answers to these difficult questions by
focusing on two issues: the evolution of legal norms in response to both
endogenous and exogenous changes, and the role that African customary
law and indigenous dispute resolution has played in promoting coordination
and cooperation among group members, thereby reducing violent
conflict. This paper explores legislative actions taken by the Nigerian
government that impede the continued evolution of these relatively
elastic customary legal norms. Property norms under customary Nigerian

1.

Armen A. Alchian, PropertyRights, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON.,

http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PropertyRights.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
2. Nigeria: Plateau state violence claimed 53,000 lives-report, U.N. INTEGRATED
REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, Oct. 8, 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/report. asp?ReportlD
=43580.
3. The state of emergency is now over. For the text of the Declaration, see Declaration
of Emergency Rule in Plateau State of Nigeria by President Olusegun Obasanjo,
URHOBO HIST. Soc'Y, May 18, 2004, http://www.waado.org/ NigerDelta/FedGovtlFederalism/
emergencyrule/plateau obasanjo.html. For reporting on the event, see Nigeria: Obasanjo
declares state of emergency in Plateau State, GLOBAL SECURITY, May 18, 2004,

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/05/ mil-040518-irin02.htm.
4. Nigeria:Plateaustate violence claimed 53, 000 lives-report,supra note 2.
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law were flexible enough to provide a wide variety of property rights
and allow for the peaceful trading and reasonable protection of these
rights, all at relatively low cost. In addition, accessible indigenous
dispute-resolution mechanisms provided access to leaders with substantial
local knowledge of local property rights arrangements. This paper also
examines Nigeria's customary land use rules for dealing with strangers,
and considers how these provisions have reduced transactional costs and
aligned expectations about property norms.
In 1978, a federal statute changed formal de jure rules governing
property law, imposing a costlier, more formalized and centralized
approach to land-use issues. This paper suggests that the new legislation,
coupled with significant enforcement problems, may be responsible for
some of the violence in Plateau State. Examining the ways in which the
property-right environment has changed may provide insight into the
sources of the violence plaguing the Nigerian highlands in Plateau
State.5
A. The Outline of the Crisis
Consider Yelwa. On May 2, 2004, in this small town in Plateau State,
a group of Christian Taroks carrying guns and machetes attacked and
murdered over 600 Fulani Muslims. 6 The attack was meant to avenge a

Fulani massacre of 50 Taroks that had taken place inside a church in
February 2004. That massacre, in turn, was a reprisal for earlier attacks
by Christians against Fulanis. The attacks devastated the town and the
region. One reporter noted: "Churches and mosques were razed. Neighbor
turned against neighbor. Reprisal attacks spread until finally, in mid-May,
the government imposed emergency rule." 7 While ethnic and religious
conflicts partially explain the vicious confrontations, at heart, this
massacre seems to have centered around land. New York Times reporter
Somini Sengupta wrote:

5. The official motto of Plateau state is the "Home of Peace and Tourism." See Tom
Thatcher & Rosie Thatcher, THATCHER'S WEBS1TE, Oct. 30, 2001, http://www.thachers.
org/Oct%202001%20files/oct_2001.htm (this personal website, run by an American
doctor and missionary in Nigeria, also shows photos of the aftermath of the Jos riots).
6. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Nigeria: Prevent Further Bloodshed in
Plateau State, (May 11, 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/11/
nigeri8568_txt.htm.
7. Somini Sengupta, Letter from Africa; Where the Land Is a Tinderbox, the
Killing Is a Frenzy, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 2004, at A4.

Before there were mass graves here, there was the matter of cows and corn
patches. Some years ago ... farmers accused cattle herders of deliberately sending their
long-homed beasts to trample across their plots. Cattle herders accused farmers
setting their grassy meadows on fire to keep their animals from
of deliberately
8
grazing.

Other observers agree. Human Rights Watch characterized the massacre as
"a prolonged conflict over land use as well as political and economic
control." 9 Discussing the conflict in Yelwa, Alex Vines of the Royal
Institute of African Affairs argued that it was, at heart, a contest over
land.' Sengupta observed: "In recent years, as the desert has spread,
trees have been felled and the populations of both herders and farmers
have soared, the competition for land has only intensified."" Mark
Doyle of the BBC echoed this insight:
While there is great wealth at the top of Nigerian society.. .there is also great
poverty and some of the violence reflects a struggle for resources and survival.
This is particularly the case in rural areas along a belt of territory across the
centre of the country, including Plateau State, where farmers are in competition
for land and resources with herders. In areas where farmers are predominantly
settled Christians and where cattle herders, originally from further north, are
mainly Muslim, an impression can be created of 'religious' or 'ethnic' tension.
But in reality the root causes
12 of the violence are political and economic-a
competition for fertile land.

If the inhabitants of Yelwa, and of Plateau State more generally,
compete for a scarce resource-land-in an increasingly heterogeneous
environment, 13 economic theory predicts that they would seek to create
8. Id.
9. Nigeria: Prevent Further Bloodshed in Plateau State, supra note 6.
10. Sengupta, supra note 7.
11. 1d. For a discussion of the relationship between property rights and migratory
herding, see TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH 239-42 (1998).
12. Mark Doyle, Poverty behind Nigeria's violence, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION,
May 19, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3730109.stm (last visited
Nov. 5, 2005). The same sentiment is found in a report by EDC News:
"It is more of a matter of the natives fearing their land was being taken over and
deciding to fight for it," [a local expert] said. The Sahara Desert is steadily
advancing southwards, forcing many farming and grazing communities in the
Nigeria's [sic] far-north to move south in search of greener pastures. Their arrival in
central Nigeria has increased pressure on the land. Many indigenous communities
in the Middle Belt have been afraid that they will lose out to the newcomers.
See Conflict in northernNigeria more about land and livelihoods than religion, ENV'T &
DEv. CHALLENGES NEWS, May 7, 2004, http:/www.edcnews.se/Cases/NigeriaYelwa2004.html
(last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
13. The population in northern Nigeria grew from approximately 16.8 million in
1952 (the date of the first reliable census taken by the British) to approximately 47.3
million in 1991 (the date of the last reliable census by the independent government).
This growth represents an annual increase of 2.61% per annum, though in some regions,
such as Plateau State and Niger State increases have been more substantial-3.5% in
Plateau per annum and 3.12% in Niger. Sustained droughts in the far northeast of
Nigeria are partially responsible for the increase of population in the more humid areas
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and enforce more individualized land rights in order to internalize
externalities caused by these changes. Individual land rights would allow
them to allocate land more efficiently and to restrict entry to better

capture the increasing value of land. 14 Unfortunately, the legislative solution
to land-use and land-allocation issues in modem Nigeria-the Land Use
Act of 1978 15-- creates a rigid legal environment that limits intemalization
efforts by prohibiting the sale of land, restricting permissible lot sizes,
and requiring government permission to lend or lease property. 16 Such
rigidity contrasts with the relatively elastic customary law in Plateau,
changes in market
which provided a rich array of mechanisms to manage
17
value and technology, including the sale of land.
Complicating this situation is the Nigerian government's inability, or
unwillingness, to effectively mediate conflicts: "In the latest incident,

of Plateau and Niger. Werner Fricke, FactorsGoverning the RegionalPopulationDevelopment
in NE-Nigeria, in PERSISTENCE AND TRANSFORMATION BETWEEN CHAD BASIN AND BENUE

(1999) (presented at the Symposium of the Sonder-forschungsbereich, May 29, 1999),
available at http://www.rzuser.uni-heidelberg. de/-bul/sfb/dl/Sessionfricke www symp99_2.
html. The Annual Abstract of Statistics of Nigeria lists the 1991 population of Plateau state
at 3,312,412. The projected population for 1998 was 4,627,043. See FED. OFFICE OF
STATISTICS, ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS (Nig.), tbls. 12-13 at 26-27 (1999).
14. In his seminal work, Harold Demsetz argues: "[P]roperty rights develop to
internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of
internalization. Increased internalization, in the main, results from changes in economic
values . . .changes to which old property rights are poorly attuned." Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967). He goes on to
discuss the ways in which Montagnes Indians developed property rights in hunting
grounds in response to increases in the value of fur-bearing animals. Id.at 351-53; see
also Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A
Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1137, 1141 (1972); Terry L.
Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 118, 119 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney
eds., 2003).
15. Land Use Act Decree No. 6 (1978) (Nigeria) [hereinafter Land Use Act].
Shortly before the Land Use Act was implemented in 1978, 34,656.1 hectares of land in
the Benue/Plateau state were "purchased," which is defined as "bought for cash" by
official Nigerian government documentation. In 1967 Benue and Plateau were merged,
they have since been separated. See FED. OFFICE OF STATISTICS (AGRIC. SURVEY UNIT),
RURAL ECONOMIC SURVEY (Nig.), tbls. 2.1-2.3 (1980). In 1977/78 this number had, for
Plateau alone, fallen to 7,602 and in 1978/79 the number was 243 or 0.12 percent of the
land in Plateau state. The Land Use Act prohibits such sales.
16. See Land Use Act, supra note 15.
17. Discussing the customary land law of Papua New Guinea, Robert Cooter
writes: "[M]y general view (is) that customary law is living law, which changes and
develops according to the wishes of the people who are subject to it." ROBERT COOTER,
ISSUES INCUSTOMARY LAND LAW 4 (1989). The customary land law of Nigeria changed

as well, responding to differing needs and constraints. See discussion infra pp. 36-45.

police and army reinforcements were only sent to Yelwa after hundreds
of people had already been killed.' 8 President Obasanjo, in his May 18,
2004 Declaration stated:
As at [sic] today, there is nothing on [the]ground and no evidence whatsoever to
show that the State Governor has the interest, desire, commitment, credibility and
capacity to promote reconciliation, rehabilitation, forgiveness, peace, harmony and
stability. If anything, some of his utterances, his lackadaisical attitude and
seeming uneven-handedness over the salient and contending issues present him
as not just part of the problem, but also as an instigator and a threat to peace.
Plateau State cannot and must not experience another spate of violence, killings
and destruction of property. If allowed, the crisis will engulf the entire nation. A

When resources are highly valued and competitors for these resources
are numerous and heterogeneous, formal governance structures are normally
needed both to define and enforce competitors' rights. 20 However, formal
governance structures designed to manage property disputes in Nigeria's
highlands are corrupt, costly and/or non-existent.
This corruption and costliness traps the people of Plateau State
between the proverbial rock and hard place. Rising land values in
Plateau due to increased demand should lead to a gradual movement
away from the traditional communal property regime towards greater
individualization of tenure.2 2 However, the Land Use Act blocks this
evolutionary move by prohibiting land sales and by encumbering other
18. Nigeria: Prevent Further Bloodshed in Plateau State, supra note 6. There is
evidence that government officials knew in March that reprisals on the citizens of Yelwa
were planned in response to the February killings. Despite assurances that the
government would "deal decisively" with any plotters, little was actually done to prevent
the bloodshed. See Nigeria:2,500 displaced in PlateauState violence, says Red Cross,
U.N. INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, Mar. 4, 2004, http://www.reliefweb.int/w/
rwb.nsf/0/60dd46cd396516f285256e4d0076eb95?.
19. Declaration of Emergency Rule in Plateau State of Nigeria by President
Olusegun Obasanjo,supra note 3.
20. Gary D. Libecap, Contractingfor Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 142, 145 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney
eds., 2003) (noting that in such a situation, "the power of the state usually is necessary to
supplement informal constraints on access and use"; in Nigeria, the state fails to provide
such supplemental support).
21.
Cf Bolaji Abdullahi, Country Reports: Nigeria, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT
2004 224 (Robin Hodess et al. eds., 2004), availableat http://www. globalcorruptionreport.org/
download/gcr2004/l1 _Country reportsLZ.pdf. In 2004, Nigeria placed next to last in a
score of perception of corruption within the state. Id.
22. Demsetz, supra note 14, at 350. In situations where property values increase,
competition for control of the resource often increases. For discussions of increased
conflict over land as a result of increases in value see generally LEE J. ALSTON, GARY D.
LIBECAP & BERNARDO MUELLER, TITLES, CONFLICT AND LAND USE (1999) (discussing

episodes of violence in the Brazilian rain forest in response to increasing demand for
land); see also Gershon Feder & David Feeny, Land Tenure andProperty Rights: Theory
and Implicationsfor DevelopmentPolicy, 5(1) THE WORLD BANK ECON. REv. 135, 138-39
(1991) (discussing the conflict levels in Thailand in the late 19th century in response to
rising land value).
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permitted transfers with significant bureaucratic obstacles.2 3 This new,
legislatively imposed system of land allocation replaces evolved
indigenous dispute resolutions mechanisms with a costlier, bureaucratized
dispute-resolution system that is widely perceived as corrupt. 24 Finally,
as President Obasanjo claims, the process for enforcing these new property
rights often simply fails to function. As the federal government imposes
an ill-fitting legislative solution on land-tenure issues that the state
government fails to enforce, the people of Plateau may be left to take
"justice" into their own hands, resulting in anarchy.
Unfortunately, the Yelwa massacre was not an isolated incident.
Major riots occurred in the northern Plateau city of Jos in 2001.26 In
2002, Fulanis attacked the Tarok people in Wase in southern Plateau; in
March 2003, the Fulanis attacked another Tarok settlement, resulting in
over 80 deaths; and in June 2003, over 500 people were killed. 27 Reprisals
also followed the Yelwa massacre. 28 The Jos riots, while attributed to

23. Changes in the value of land in Plateau state, and the desire of individuals to
capture this increased value, may be leading people to band together to better block entry
by non-group members. If there is strength in numbers, dissatisfaction with the current
land system in Plateau state may be causing people to group together to fight off threats
to their property claims. This destructive collective action may represent a response to
an unproductive de jure system and an attempt to adjust the defacto property rights in
the absence of effective government action. See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR
PROPERTY RIGHTS 16 (1989) [hereinafter CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS].
[Stating that] an increase in relative prices or a fall in production costs will raise the
stream of rents attainable from ownership and encourage new competition for
control. Old enforcement mechanisms may no longer be adequate, leading to
rent dissipation as inputs are diverted from production to protect against
trespass and theft ... capturing a portion of any rents that can be saved by
more precisely defining property rights motivates individuals to organize
for collective action to adjust property institutions from their current state to
the new conditions.
Id.
24. See discussion infra pp. 47-52.
25. For an economic analysis of the decision-making process involved in determining
when to negotiate property rights claims and when to fight over conflicting claims, see
generally Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade? An Economic Model
ofIndian-White Relations, 37 J.L. & ECON. 39,39-74 (1994).
26. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Jos: A CITY TORN APART (BACKGROUND) (2001),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/nigeria/; see also 20 dead in fresh Plateau
violence despite state of emergency, GLOBAL SECURITY, May 20, 2004, http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/05/mil-040520-irin02.htm.
27. Plateau State: Communal Conflicts in Wase (Southern Plateau) and Berom
area (NorthernPlateau), INST. FOR DEMOCRACY INS. AFR., Mar. 1, 2003, http://www. idasa.
org.za (follow Programmes, Peacebuilding, Reports, Weekly Update March 2003 link).
28. See 20 dead infresh Plateau violence despite state of emergency, supra note 26.

discontent over a political appointment, were likely exacerbated by
uncertain property rights, which made it difficult to effectively absorb
large numbers of internally displaced Nigerians. Human Rights Watch
notes:
[M]any people fleeing conflicts in their own areas had sought protection and safety
in Jos; some had even settled there. Some observers believe that this regular
influx of populations from neighboring states may have ended up destabilizing
the tranquility of Jos. People fleeing in 2000 and 2001 from clashes in Kaduna,
Bauchi, Taraba, and Nasarawa states may have inadvertently contributed to
creating an atmosphere of fear among inhabitants of Plateau State by testifying
to the atrocities they had left behind, some of which were still continuing. The
increase in the population in Jos, in particular, also created an increase in
economic pressures, leading in turn to the scarcity of some goods
29 and increase
in prices. Resources became stretched, and tensions began to rise.

Since 1999, a number of other northern and middle belt states in Nigeria
have experienced repeated episodes of violence.30 Violence escalated
following the election of the civilian government of Olusegun Obasanjo
in 1999, and particularly after the reintroduction of sharia law in criminal
cases in 12 northern Nigeria states in 2000. 3 1 In the intervening years,

thousands were killed, leading President Obasanjo to declare a state of
emergency in Plateau State in 2004.32
These conflicts are typically characterized as struggles between ethnic
and religious factions. 33 Nigeria is extraordinarily diverse, composed of

29. See Jos: A CITY TORN APART, supra note 26.
30. See Nigeria: 2,500 displaced in PlateauState violence, says Red Cross, supra
note 18. The 1980s and 1990s have been described as particularly repressive in Nigeria.
See Abdul-Ganiyu Garba & P. Kassey Garba, Open Conflicts when State, Institution and
Market fail: The case of Nigeria 38 (June 5, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Department of Economics, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria) (the recent rise
in the incidence of violence may be tied to the election of a civilian leader. Under a
military dictatorship, discord and attendant violence might be more effectively suppressed,
whereas under civilian rule it might prove more difficult to suppress discord and violent
conflict. Nigeria elected President Obasanjo in 1999. The country was ruled by military
dictators from 1983 to 1999).
31. Sharia,or Islamic criminal law, was introduced in the northern state of Zamfara
in January, 2000. Sharia had been outlawed after Nigeria's independence in 1960. Since
its reintroduction in 2000, 12 states have adopted sharia.See John Paden, Islam and
Democratic Federalism in Nigeria, 8 AFR. NOTES 1, 1-2 (2002). In Nigeria, sharia
is applied is applied to Muslims only in both civil and criminal cases. However, actions
of vigilante groups, who "watch" for sharia violations, have resulted in non-Muslims
feeling increasingly intimidated and, in some cases, in attacks against non-Muslims. See
Nigeria'sSharia Split, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, Oct. 15, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
l/hi/world/africa/1 600804.stm.
32.

David Cowan (ed.) Nigeria Country Report, THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNrr

1 (Aug., 2004), available at http://www.eiu.com (subscription service required).
33. See Gilbert Da Costa, Resurgence in ethnic violence kills hundreds in Nigeria,
PORTSMOUTH HERALD, Aug. 23, 1999, available at http://www.seacoastonine.com/1999news/
8_23_w2.htm.
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over 250 ethnic groups.34 Plateau State alone has 54 different ethnic
groups. 35 Some of these groups experience conflicts related to political
rivalries, religious differences and access to resources. The Yelwa massacre
is an example of the latter type of conflict.36
The country is divided not only along ethnic lines, but also along
religious lines. Approximately 50% of the population is Muslim, 40%
Christian, and 10% adhere to indigenous animist beliefs.37 Of the 36 states
in the Nigerian federation, the 19 northern states are predominately Muslim,
while the 17 southern states are predominately Christian.38
The heterogeneity of Nigerian society makes for a potentially explosive
mix. Since its independence from British colonial rule in 1960, political
power in Nigeria has shifted back and forth between representatives
of different ethnic, regional, and religious groups, as these groups have
attempted to stem regional rivalries and distribute the benefits that flow
from political leadership. 39
34. See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html [hereinafter FACTaOOK].
35. See Funmi Peter Omale, Implementation C'tteefor Peace Confab Inaugurated,
THIS DAY (Lagos), Oct. 8, 2004, availableat http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive.php
(click link to 2004, then October).
36. NIGERIA: Muslim death toll in raid on Yelwa tops 600-Red Cross, U.N.
INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORKS, May 7, 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/
report.asp?/ReportlD=40952&SelectRegion=WestAfrica&SelectCountry-Nigeria.
37. FACTBOOK, supranote 34.
38. See Paden, supra note 31, at 1.
39. At the time of independence in 1960, Nigeria was divided into three regions:
the North, dominated by Hausa & Fulani ethnic groups, the West, dominated by Yorubas, and
the East, dominated by lgbos. See TOY1N FALOLA, THE HISTORY OF NIGERIA 10- 11
(1999). Over the past 44 years, Nigeria has been led by a northerner, Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa, who was killed in a coup led by southeastern Igbos, who in turn were overthrown in
a counter-coup led by Yakubu Gowon, a northerner from Middle Belt, which precipitated the
three-year long Biafran civil war. The Gowon government broke the three regions of
Nigeria into 12 to dampen regional tensions. This government lasted until 1975 when it
was overthrown by Murtala Muhammed another northerner who, along with Olusegun
Obasanjo, a Yoruba Christian, ruled until Muhanmed was assassinated and Obasanjo took
over. Obasanjo, a military officer, voluntarily turned power over to a northerner, Alhaji
Shehu Shagari in 1979. In 1983, a military coup displaced Shagari with Muhammad
Buhari, which was overthrown in 1985 by General Ibrahim Babaginda and Suni Abacha.
Babaginda ruled until 1993, when elections were held. Chief M.K.O. Abiola a Yoruba
from the south won these elections, which were annulled by Babaginda, who then
transferred power to an short-lived interim government, which was replaced by rule by
Abacha. Abacha died in 1998. Obasanjo was elected in 1999. On the problems associated
with power sharing and the marginalization of ethnic groups in Nigeria, see Tunde
Babawale, The Rise of Ethnic Militias, De-legitimisationof the State, and the Threat to
Nigerian Federalism, 3(1) W. AFR. REV. (2001), available at http://westafricareview.
com,/vol3.1/babawale.html.

Despite efforts to dampen regional and ethnic tensions, the mix of
ethnicities and religions has occasionally exploded into violence, most
seriously during the Biafran civil war in the late 1960s. To this day, conflict
remains a significant problem, because certain groups in Nigeria fear
40
domination by others and often perceive those in charge as corrupt.
Discontent has led to repeated demands for a change in leadership-or,
often, to violent coups-to replace leaders perceived as illegitimate or
biased with others considered more trustworthy. However, while increasing
ethnic and religious polarization among Nigerians drives much of the
nation's violence, the underlying issues that spark this violence are often
property and land-tenure disputes.
This paper attempts to identify a possible connection between the
current Nigerian property-rights regime and riots that have left
thousands dead. The focus is on Plateau State for a number of reasons.
First, Plateau is unique among the northern Nigerian states in that the
Islamic Sokoto Caliphate's hold on the region was fairly tenuous. 41
Indigenous customary norms may have lasted longer in Plateau than in
many other regions of northern Nigeria. These norms continued to develop
and modify throughout the 19th century, rather than being replaced by
"foreign" Maliki rules and customs. 4 2 Even under British rule, significant
deference was shown to customary norms and traditions in Plateau State.
The British "hands off' policy of indirect rule meant that indigenous
norms regarding land tenure and dispute resolution were largely protected
and enforced by the colonial-era Native Court system.43 Finally, the
international media outlet recognizes that some of the violence in Plateau is
tied to disputes over access to and control over land." For these reasons,
Plateau presents a unique opportunity to investigate the effects of
centralized government action (nationalization legislation)-coupled with
corruption and increasing heterogeneity-on the spontaneous evolution
of customary land tenure and property-rights norms.

40. See KARL MAIER, THIs HOUSE HAS FALLEN: MIDNIGHT IN NIGERIA 11-19 (2000).
41. British colonial official Lord Hailey states that the Fulani system of rule did
not, however, extend throughout Northern Nigeria; on the Bauchi plateau and south of
the Benue River there were large areas where 'pagan' tribes had never fully acquiesced
in it. Though it would have been convenient to treat those areas as falling within the
Fulani system, this was not thought to be justified. LORD HAILEY, AN AFRICAN SURVEY:
REVISED 1956 454 (1957).
42. See ROBERT McC. NETTING, HILL FARMERS OF NIGERIA 46-47 (1968).
43. See id. at 48-51.
44.

See discussion supra pp. 2-4.
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I. THE PROPERTY ENVIRONMENT: PROPERTY IN LAND AND
LAND TENURE IN NIGERIA

Before 1978, three primary sources of property law existed in Nigeria:
customary law, English common and statutory law, and post-colonial
legislation. Since 1978, land law in Nigeria has been based exclusively
on the Land Use Act of 1978, 45 a federal statute incorporated into the
Nigerian Constitution.
A. Customary Land Law
Traditionally, Nigerians believed that property in land in Nigeria
belonged to God, but was held communally in a community-based tenure
system.4 6 Under this system, the first person to clear and use unclaimed
land established possession and use rights.47 This first possessor would
allocate land to heads of families based on need.48 Over time, the first
possessor's role was taken on by a headman or traditional chief, who
would allocate property to family heads. These family heads would then
allocate land for use by their family members.4 9
Among the duties of the chief were to manage community land
reserves, maintain group customs concerning land use, ensure that the
45. Land Use Act, supra note 15.
46. See N.O. Adedipe, J.E. Olawoye, E.S. Olarinde & A.Y. Okediran, Rural communal
tenure regimes andprivate landownershipin western Nigeria,FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF
THE U.N., LAND REFORM BULL. 1997/2, available at http://www.fao.org/ sd/LTdirect/
LR972/w6728t13.htm (follow "Land Reform Bulletin" and scroll down to find source);
E. Wayne Nafziger, Economy: Land Use, Soils, and Land Tenure, in NIGERIA: A
COUNTRY STUDY 155, 176 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1992), available at http://hdl. loc.
gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.ng (follow "Land Use, Soils, and Land Tenure" hyperlink). Note,
however, that in an older treatise on African customary law, ICJ Justice T. Olawale
Elias argues that it is incorrect to conceive of the African land tenure system as
communal. Rather, it is more appropriate, he argues, to consider it as corporate. T.
OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 164 (1956).
47. See Adedipe et al., supra note 46.
48. These rights may be perpetual or for a period of time. See Emea Arua & Eugene
Okorji, Multidimensionalanalysis of land tenure systems in eastern Nigeria, FOOD AND
AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., LAND REFORM BULL. 1997/2, availableat http://www. fao.org/sd/
LTdirect/LR972/w6728t14.htm. Also, rights for the temporary use of land could be granted
to other groups. An example would be granting the right to herders to allow their animals
to graze the stubble in a field that has been harvested. See Hubert Ouedraogo & Camilla
Toulmin, Tenure Rights and Sustainable Development in Western Africa: A Regional
Overview 2 (paper presented at DFID Workshop on Land Tenure, Poverty, and
Sustainable Development in sub-Saharan Africa, Feb. 16-19, 1999), available at http://www.
oxfam.org.uk/what we do/issues/livelihoodsOandrights/Africa est.htrL
49. Ouedraogo& Toulmin, supra note 48, at 4.

rights of the group were not diminished, and see that the rights of group
members (and, when appropriate, the rights of strangers) were respected.
The chief held residuary, reversionary rights to the property as a trustee
on behalf of the group and never as an absolute owner. 50 These duties
provided the chief with income (often in the form of in-kind payments of
agricultural products and/or with cash payments for serving as an arbiter
of disputes) and significant social status, as well as political control over
the group.
The chief, usually along with appropriate elders, bore primary
responsibility for managing the indigenous dispute resolution process
concerning land-use rights. 52 In some groups, permanent tribunals existed
with identifiable judicial officers, whose job it was to bring offenders
before the tribunal and thereby help preserve social order.53 Land disputes
were an important part of the case work of such tribunals. Cases involving
land might address boundary disputes, disputes over the length of time
one party was permitted to borrow or lease land, or the right of a party
to
54
occupy land in perpetuity if it seemed the land had been gifted away.
When a dispute among members of the same family lineage arose, the
aggrieved party would call for a meeting of the family or village
headman and his advisors to resolve the issue.55 The headman and/or elders
would request that the aggrieved party state his or her case. The accused
would also be asked to state what he or she knew about the dispute. This
oral evidence relied on the memories of disputants, family members, and
witnesses to transactions. The headman, along with the elders, would
cross-examine witnesses and then consult among themselves in order to
reach at a decision.56
These norms created a kind of informal property registry, or recording
office. Reliance on memories required disputants and adjudicators to draw

50.
51.

ELIAS, supra note 46, at 164.
On the issue of payments of chiefs for land-related duties see GAZETrEERS OF
THE PLATEAU PROVINCE, NIGERIA (comp. by C.G. Ames, Jos Native Admin. 1934),
reprintedin 4 GAZETTEERS OF THE NORTHERN PROVINCES OF NIGERIA 174 (Frank Cass &
Co. Ltd. 1972) [hereinafter GAZETTEER].
52. For an interesting discussion of dispute resolution among the Tiv, an ethnic
group located near, but not in, Plateau state see PAUL BOHANNAN, JUSTICE AND
JUDGMENT AMONG THE Tiv 30-31 (1968). While chiefs and elders often met in a kind of
judicial session, disputes might also be taken directly to a chief for resolution. For a
description of the way in which a civil case was conducted, see ELIAS, supra note 46, at
238-43.
53. ELIAS, supra note 46, at 218-19.
54. See BOHANNAN, supra note 52, at 60-61; GAZETTEER, supra note 51, at 114.
55. See ELIAS, supra note 46, at 217-22. Elias notes that disputes over land were
considered "great" subject matter and so would often be resolved in the chief's court,
under more formal rules of procedure.
56. See BOHANNAN, supra note 52, at 28-69.
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heavily from the bank of dispersed local knowledge. 57 This process,
which required people to proclaim openly, or "publish," what they knew,
and to swear to the truthfulness of their statements, was one possible
way to reduce information asymmetries, thereby reducing transactional
costs. 58 Relatively transparent communications of this sort would also
decrease levels of uncertainty within a community. On the other hand,
there were clear drawbacks to reliance on memory. However, despite
the drawbacks, in an isolated area with a small and compact population,
such an approach may have been cost effective when compared with the
more formal, and costly, specification of rights.5 9
When disputes between families or villages arose, the headman or subchief would approach a headman or sub-chief of a third group. This
third party would attempt to resolve the dispute, provided both parties to
the dispute agreed. 60 Refusal to submit to third-party adjudication would
be reported to the tribe's main chief.61 If the case warranted, the head
chief would be called on to hear and resolve the dispute. In cases of
disputes between tribes, emissaries would be sent by the aggrieved tribe
to the tribe allegedly causing the harm, asking for redress. In62 some
cases, appeal was made directly to a third tribe to act as mediator.
Even in less hierarchical societies, those in which political power was
dispersed, civil disputes were handled in a similar manner: an elder
would hear a dispute and appeal to a more influential elder. If a case
were especially important, it would be taken to an ad hoc council of
elders of the family lines in the local community.63 A variety of other
methods for initiating the resolution phase existed.64 Paul Bohannan

57. See generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv.
519, 519-30 (1945).
58. Note that such publication becomes costly in high-risk environments where
officials, or others, can seize resources with relative impunity. See Benito Arrufiada,
PropertyEnforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J. L. & ECON. & ORG. 401, 410-13

(2003); see also Feder & Feeny, supra note 22, at 140.
59.

YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 2-4 (1989).

60. See ELIAS, supra note 46, at 217.
61. Id.
62. Id. at218.
63. Id. at 220.
64. These included announcing a dispute by beating drum throughout a village,
which works to call elders together, the party seeking redress might go to a group of
spiritual elders, whose jurisdiction might be broader than that of village elders, a spear
might be place before an accused party's home, signifying the need for speedy resolution
of the claim. In cases where the offender was unknown, a "diviner" would be used to

notes that land disputes were quite common, though he does not
comment on the frequency with which they led to violence.65
Family members enjoyed the right to possess and to use land located
in the family's territory. In other words, land was jointly owned on a kinship
basis. 66 Under the customary tenure system, women were normally not
allowed to own or inherit property, though their husbands typically
"gave" them some land to work each year. 67 Traditionally, women had
usufructory rights over certain land as long as they lived with their
husband's family.68
An individual was required to use land to benefit the family or
community group.69 So long as an individual made beneficial use of
land, he could keep the property, pass it on to his heirs, and even pledge
its use in satisfaction of a debt. 70 Individuals as well as families had
rights to exclude both strangers and, in certain situations, family members.
However, non-family members (strangers) could, if given permission by
the headman or chief, use land in the territory of the community of
which he is a member-a point that will be addressed below. 71 Further,
groups and individuals were allowed to lend land. Indeed, so long as
land was available, the group or individual holding the unused land

help identify the culprit-though this variety of detective work was rarely used in
private, civil suits. Id. at 220-21.
65. BOHANNAN, supra note 52, at 31. However, there is some evidence that land
disputes in Plateau during the colonial era were somewhat uncommon. GAZETrEER, supra
note 51, at 114 (stating that, "Disputes about the ownership of land are rare and, when
they do occur, they invariably arise out of a lease or loan."). Additionally, news reports
claim that Muslims and Christians in these areas "had coexisted peacefully in these rural
communities for decades, but that all changed in 2001 when a complex mixture of
religious issues, disputes over land tenure and politics led to a spat of tit-for-tat killings
and communal attacks." See Nigeria, 2,500 displaced in Plateau State violence, says Red
Cross, supra note 18.
66. Adedipe et al., supra note 46.
67. NETTING, supra note 42, at 167.
68. Arua & Okorji, supra note 48.
69. Cooter discusses one of the key roles played by a communal property system:
"Customary land law creates an incentive structure for cooperation and coordination
among kin in the production and distribution of goods. The incentive structure includes
a network of mutual obligations, which restricts everyone's freedom. In such a network
there can be no unitary, absolute ownership." COOTER, supranote 17, at 15.
70. See Nafziger, supra note 46. Individuals could leave land unused for periods of
time and still exert claims over land. The period of non-use could not be "unreasonable"
however, or the individual would forfeit his rights. See ELIAS, supra note 46, at 163.
71. Toyin Falola, Nigeria's indigenous economy, in NIGERIAN HISTORY AND
CULTURE 97, 98 (Richard Olaniyan, ed., 1985); see also A.S. Bamire & Y.L. Fabiyi,
Economic implications of property rights on smallholder use of fertilizer in
southwest Nigeria, in LAND REFORM, available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/
Y2519T/y2519t08.htm.
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could not refuse to lend to one who asked, though increasing scarcity
placed strains on the lending system.7
Generally, individuals were not able to sell or mortgage property.73
However, pledging land and never redeeming it created a near
equivalent of sale. 74 Furthermore, there is evidence that in areas where
significant labor was expended developing land for farming, a system
approaching individualized tenure existed.75
Individuals were unable to acquire property by adverse possession.7 6
However, individuals had full rights of ownership in physical structures
they added to real property, as well as to any plants and trees they
added.77 Apparently, the customary idea of rights to land did not include
the items found on the land that someone else placed there. This means that
one family could have use rights to the soil, and another family who had
planted nut trees on the land, could have rights to protect, maintain, and
use the nuts. Under customary norms, the legal idea of land was limited to
the soil. Finally, it was only the family or the community, acting under
the direction of family and/or community leaders, that could dispose of
property.
Towns and villages could also hold land. These lands typically included
grazing and hunting lands, market sites, and such areas as sacred groves.7 8
Today, corporate bodies known as corporate aggregates still hold land
under communal tenure.79 Some lands were "attached" to particular offices,
or positions: obas in the south and emirs in the north. Legal rights in
these lands were absolute. Over time, the role of the obas and emirs with
and these traditional leaders lost some of
regards to land diminished,
80
their prestige and power.

72.
73.

Ouedraogo & Toulmin, supra note 48, at 4.
Falola, supra note 71, at 98.

74.

NETTING,

supra note 42, at 166.

75. Netting states, "The multiplicity of arrangements for sharing, renting, and loaning
land insures that an existing land base can be periodically redistributed according to need
while preserving the principle fundamental to Kofyar intensive agriculture, that land is
an individual possession." Id. at 167-68.
76. ELIAS, supra note 46, at 163.
77. Id. at 166.
78. Adedipe et al. supra note 46.
79. Arua & Okorji, supra note 48. Corporate aggregates include rural towns,
villages, patrilineal and matrilineal groups, as well as extended and nuclear families.
80. Id.

Much land in Nigeria is still held based on customary rights.
However, both the population and the demand for land have increased. 81
As a result, land available for use and development is becoming scarcer.
Studies from the mid-20th century report limited availability of land in
some areas and the sale of land in certain districts. 82 After Nigerian
independence in 1960, land sales continued, furthering a move away83
from communal ownership and towards increased private ownership.
In order to sell land under customary law, the family member wishing to
sell must receive the consent of all principal members of the family.
Consideration must be paid for the transaction to be valid, and the seller
must provide evidence of the "handing over" of possession in the
presence of witnesses.84 The partition of family or communal land is a
signal that customary tenure rights85 are ending. However, in some areas,
purchase of land remains difficult.
The ability of families and communities to hold land based on
customary rights was modified by the 1978 Land Use Decree, which
vested ownership of all land in the government "to be held in trust and
administered for the use and common benefit of all Nigerians. 86 The
Act creates a land-tenure system in which the sovereign holds ultimate
title to the land, but allows for the long-term leasing of property.8 7
Land-administration functions were taken from chiefs, family heads,
and local communities and transferred to administrative agencies. Issues
involving the sale, lease or inheritance of land were to be managed by
these agencies, which operate under the office of the state governors.
Previous forms of title have been replaced by "certificates of occupancy,"
which are issued by either state officials (in the case of urban land) or
81. See Fricke, supra note 13.
82. NETTING, supra note 42, at 100; see GAZETTEER, supra note 51, at 166 (reporting
sales of land among the Angas tribe of Plateau).
83. Chimah Ezeomah, Land Tenure Constraints Associated with Some Recent
Experiments to Bring Formal Education to Nomadic Fulani in Nigeria (Pastoral Dev.
Network, Overseas Dev. Inst., Network Paper,1985), available at http://www.
odi.org.uk/pdn/papers/20d.pdf; see also Bamire & Fabiyi, supra note 71, at 3 (who
note that increased reliance on cash crops such as cocoa, oil palm, cola nut and
coffee, in conjunction with technologies that increase agricultural production,
making agricultural land more valuable are also leading to increased individual
ownership).
84. Adedipe et al., supra note 46.
85. Arua & Okorji, supra note 48.
86. Land Use Act, supra note 15, § 1.
87. As a part of its controversial land-reform efforts, the government of
Zimbabwe has also taken title to land and issues 99-year leases to potential users. See
Zimbabwe: govt moves to nationalize allproductive land, U.N. INTEGRATED REGIONAL
INFORMATION NETWORKS, June 8, 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD
=41476.
88. Donald C. Williams, Measuring the Impact of Land Reform Policy in Nigeria,
30 J.OF MODERN AFR. STUD. 587,588-89 (1992).
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local government officials (in the case of most rural land).8 9 These
officials have the power to revoke customary rights if land is needed for
a public purpose.
In addition to this change in the legal environment, exogenous factors
are causing changes in the customary tenure system. As noted above,
population increases, migrations resulting from the increased desertification
of northern Nigeria, and increasing urbanization, all increase the strain
on land use in northern and middle belt Nigeria. 90 These pressures may
lead to a desire among inhabitants for increased individualization of
tenure and away from the restrictive Land Use Act regime and the
traditional communal property tenure system. 91
B. Property Norms in Northern Nigeria
Until the early 19th century, northern Nigeria was largely controlled
by the Hausas, the main ethnic group in northern Nigeria. The Hausas
maintained a customary land-tenure system until the first decade of the
19th century. During the very early 19th century, Muslim Fulanis, led
by Usman dan Fodio, extended their control over a significant portion of
northern Nigeria, creating the Sokoto Caliphate. 92 As their control
expanded, they instituted changes in land-tenure rules. The new Fulani rulers
took control of Hausa lands and vested ownership rights over these lands
in the Sultan of Sokoto. 9 3 Land held by the Sultan was divided into reserve
lands, considered "state" property to be used by the Sultanate; cultivated
lands, for which imams determined use allocations; unused lands, also
under the control of imams; and finally, waqf lands, to be used for the
benefit of the entire community.94 This system provided extensive control
over land to imams, who would grant use rights and, at times, assign
unused land without reference to the needs of the local community.9 5
However, while Plateau State is part of northern Nigeria, it was subject
89. Ouedraogo & Toulmin, supra note 48, at 16.
90. Sengupta, supranote 7.
91. Ouedraogo & Toulmin, supra note 48, at 5-6. Lord Hailey recognized similar
pressures in Nigeria in the mid 20th century when he noted that, "The principal effect of
economic development (in Nigeria) has been seen in the increasing tendency to delimit
individual holdings, both in Muslim and pagan areas." HARLEY, supra note 41, at 789.
92. See FALOLA, THE HISTORY OF NIGERIA, supra note 39, at 35.
93. Ezeomah, supranote 83, at 2.
94. John Paden, Islamic PoliticalCulture and ConstitutionalChange in Nigeria,
11 J. OF OPINION 24, 25 (1981).
95. Nafziger, supranote 46, at 176.

to only limited Fulani control, primarily in the periphery of the region.9 6
Most of the inhabitants of the interior of Plateau were free from the
Fulani conquest, 97 and thus Fulani institutions did not take root there.
The Fulani were unable to exercise extensive control over Plateau, because
its rugged terrain, coupled with the fiercely independent nature of its
inhabitants, made both military conquest and subsequent administration
too costly. 98 The Plateau region
99 provided a refuge for people escaping a
variety of potential overlords.
Even in the 19th century Plateau was highly heterogeneous, and was
composed of many small ethnic groups who lived independently but
engaged in some trade with each other. 100 The various tribes that inhabited
Plateau moved there in order to escape threats posed by slave-raiding
expeditions in the coastal regions and the Islamic north, and to search for
available land.10 1 In the 19th century, the people of Plateau were primarily
animists and had a less developed, less
02 hierarchical political and social
structure than did the Hausa/Fulanis.1
After the British took control of Nigeria in 1900, they created different
governing structures in the North and South: the Protectorate of North
Nigeria and the Protectorate of South Nigeria. 103 As is true to this day,
southern Nigeria was richer than the north and had a stronger tradition of
autonomy. However, as the North had a well-developed administrative
structure and was governed by what was viewed as a "respectful" and
conservative leadership, the British adopted a "hands-off' approach to
the north. 10 4 The British institution of indirect rule largely left the Muslim
leadership in place. 10 5 It also respected the sharia law of the north,'as
well as the customary laws of the area. 106
96.
97.

GAZETTEER, supra note 51, at 30-36.
NETTING, supranote 42, at 46.

98.

GAZETTEER, supra note 51, at 31.

99. See Toyin Falola & A. Adebayo, Pre-colonialNigeria: north of the NigerBenue, in NIGERIAN HISTORY & CULTURE 56, 84-85 (Richard Olaniyan ed., 1985). This
means that there was no one supreme oba or emir in Plateau. Rather, there were many
leaders of small, discrete groups.
100. Id. at 83-84.
101. NETrING, supranote 42, at 46 (stating that, "The need to avoid slaving depredations
seems to be reflected in a zone of dense population in the hills and immediately
adjoining lowlands, with large areas of fertile plain to the south left empty."). This
observation is of significant import, as it may help us understand why control over fertile
land in Plateau state-particularly in the Yelwa region-is contested. There may be only
limited history of "control" by particular groups, thus allowing others to make competing
claims.
102. Id. at 44; see also Falola & Adebayo, supra note 99, at 84-87.
103. FALOLA, THE HISTORY OF NIGERIA, supra note 39, at 68.
104. Id. at 70.
105. Id. Falola says,
[I]ndirect rule as deployed to consolidate power and to overcome the various
obstacles posed by communications and by limitations of personnel and
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The British arrived in Plateau region in 1904 in response to requests
by the Niger Company, which faced hostile inhabitants and repeatedly
closed trading routes. 07 For reasons similar to those faced by the
Fulanis, the British were unable to subdue the inhabitants of the area in
the early years of their rule. 108 It took the repeated use of armed force to
quell uprisings and inter-ethnic violence. When the inhabitants were

finally brought under control, the British created a somewhat different
governance structure for Plateau. This structure was not based on rule

by emirs, but on a high degree of self-rule at the local level.'
Discussing the British approach to rule in Nigeria, Lord Hailey says:

9

The distinctive concepts which have determined the use of that system [Native
Authority] are shortly as follows. It has in the first place avoided as far as
possible the employment of any local authority which has not held a recognized
position of influence derived from indigenous custom or tradition. Second, it
has contemplated that the entities so employed (whether they have been Chiefs,
Chiefs in Council, Councils of Headmen, or groups of Elders) should rely
mainly on the authority they derive from indigenous custom when giving their
aid in the furtherance
of schemes of social or economic welfare promoted by the
10
Administration.

The Native Authority system gave chiefs and elders primary responsibility
for the administration of local government, and they were particularly
important in the creation and functioning of Native Courts.'
As decision
makers in this new dispute resolution process, local leaders would have
continued to bring their deep local knowledge to bear on conflict resolution.
Indeed, if, as one critic argues, the British purposefully kept formally trained
finance. The ideological assumption was that the British and Nigerians were
culturally different and the best way to govern them was through the institutions
which they themselves had invented.
Id. He goes on to note that indirect rule allowed the British to govern at low cost by coopting local rulers who continued to administer indigenous institutions.
106. Ezeomah, supra note 83, at 2. The version of sharia applied in Nigeria is the
Maliki form which follows precedent, opinions and reasoning developed under the Sunni
Muslim tradition. Imams and emirs are the key legal decision makers, interpreting the
law to the case at hand. Under the Sokoto Caliphate the emir was the chief imam and
served as the court of last appeal (the grand kadi). In contemporary Nigeria, sharia
courts have been created for each state with a grand kadi appointed for each. See Paden,
Islamic PoliticalCulture and Constitutional Change in Nigeria,supranote 94, at 25.
107. Plateau Province was formally created by the British in 1926. See GAZETrEER,
supra note 51, at 117-18.
108. Id. at 39-41.
109. Id. at 46-48.
110. HAILEY, supra note 41, at 452.
111.

FALOLA, THE HISTORY OF NIGERIA, supra note 39, at 71; see also GAZETrEER,

supra note 51, at 49-50.

lawyers out of the Native Courts, it seems likely that the indigenous dispute
resolution norms
2 which developed under customary law prevailed in
Native Courts.' 1
In Plateau, the British attempted to create a tribunal for each tribe and
even for sub-tribal units. Some large tribes had more than one court.
The members of the courts acted as an advisory council for the Executive
Chief, who served as President of the court. The British also created seven
"Alkalai" Courts, for use by non-indigenous, Muslim inhabitants of
Plateau." 3 When Plateau was divided into districts in 1927, each district
was assigned District Heads, both "Pagan" (animist) and Fulani (Muslim).
Starting in 1930, the "Pagan" District Heads began supervising tax
collection, including collection of the cattle tax imposed on the Fulani
herdsmen." 4 The notion was to move toward more extensive indirect
rule and allow the local inhabitants greater control of the structures of
governance. A further example of this approach is Lord Hailey's
observation: "The scope of rule-making power of Native Authorities was
extended in 1945 to embrace the definition and modification of Native law
and custom. In the same year they were also given special power to deal
with matters relating to the tenure of land ....
Because of the diversity of tribes in Plateau and variations in
population density, soil fertility, and abundance or scarcity of land, there
were differences among land-tenure norms. 116 For example, the Gazetteer
reports that among the Angas tribe in the Pankshin Division (eastern17
Plateau), a man who cultivated land held tenure similar to freehold."
The report notes that farmland was sold, but for a low price, indicating
relative abundance of land at the time. However, land in this area was
not leased or pawned. The practices in Pankshin Division may be
112. There has been criticism of the British approach to staffing Native Courts. Critics
argue that the British chose to appoint tribal leaders rather than trained legal academics
or practitioners to these positions. The result was a system in which individuals with
little or no formal legal training, and beholden to colonial authorities for their lucrative
positions, were in power. Such criticism, while valid, appears to discount the informal
training and deep familiarity with social norms and customs that such leaders would
have possessed. For a discussion of the drawbacks of the British model of staffing
Native Courts see FALOLA, THE HISTORY OF NIGERIA, supra note 39, at 71.
113. GAZETrEER,supra note 51, at 49.
114. Id.at 119.
115. HALEY,supra note 41, at 455.
116. Though the GAZETTEER states,
This mention of farming disputes brings us to the question of land tenure about
which tribal customs do not differ very much. Generally speaking all the land
originally belonged to the chief of the tribe or village, by right of priority of
settlement and ability to defend his boundaries and no land was taken up for
building or farming except with the consent of the chief.
GAZETrEER,supra note 51, at 113.
117. Id. at 166.
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contrasted with those of the Jos Division (northern Plateau), where land
was held in a manner more like a lease in perpetuity. 118 Land could be
leased to or borrowed by others. Leases tended to be long-term with no
set termination date, but with an annual payment in kind. Sale of land
was rare in this area, except around the town of Ganawuri, where there
was valuable fertile land. 1 9 In the Shendam Division, it seems that
inhabitants held many sticks in the bundle of property rights, but not
enough to warrant labeling their tenure as "freehold." This land could
not be sold and chiefs could dispossess inhabitants for disloyalty or as
punishment for a serious crime such murder. 120 The Gazetteer notes:
"Disputes about the ownership of land are very rare, and when they do
occur, they invariably arise out of a lease or loan.' 121
In 1916, the British enacted the Lands and Native Rights Ordinance, 22
which created a peculiar bifurcated approach to land law in Nigeria. In
southern Nigeria, most lands belonged to private citizens rather than the
government. Some property was held by a "stool" (a seat of political
authority within a communal land-holding ethnic group), some by
communal or family groups, and some by individual ownership. 123 Land
ownership and the sale of land were tracked in the south via a registry
24
system. 1
A very different system applied to northern Nigeria. 125 In the north,
the British declared all land in the former Fulani fiefs to be public
property. The fief system was abolished and ownership over land in
northern Nigeria was transferred to the British crown. As owners of the
land, the British government required those on the land to apply for
occupancy permits, though the government routinely recognized

118.

Id. at 113.

119. Id.at 114-15 (the availability of "valuable" fertile land is indicative of a
certain scarcity and may help explain the evidence of sale in the region).
120. Id.at214.
121. Id.at 114. Note that the level of dispute could be low for several reasons. For
example, if land is abundant it may be less costly to move rather than engage in dispute
over ownership. If customary norms and claims are recognized as legitimate, there might
be relatively few disputes over ownership. Finally, if disputes are suppressed, for some
reasons, they would be less visible.
122. Land and Native Rights Ordinance, (1948) Cap. 105 (Nigeria).
123. Segun Famoriyo, Land Tenure and FoodProductionin Nigeria, 41 LAND TENURE
14 (Land Tenure Ctr., Madison, Wis. 1973).
Nafziger, supra note 46, at 177.
See Land and Native Rights Ordinance, supra note 122.

CENTERNEWSL. 10,

124.
125.

customary rights of occupancy. 126 This system placed limits on the ability
of outsiders to move into northern areas. 127 It also had the effect of
creating segregated areas of "strangers," or Sabon Garis. Settlers were
those people whose relatives had been in the area longer than "nonindigenes" or "strangers." Non-indigenes were granted fewer legal rights
than settlers. This differential access to land, to local government
services, and to political representation created tensions throughout northern
Nigeria-tensions that remain to this day.
As a part of northern Nigeria, these same rules applied in Plateau
State. Yet, because the British administrators showed significant deference
to local customs there, and because authorities had greater difficulty
"reaching" into the hinterlands of Plateau and exerting control, the actual
de facto impact of the Land and Native Ordinance Act in much of
Plateau may have been muted. 128 Instead, it seems that customary norms
surrounding tenure rights, leasing, borrowing, pledging, and even sales
of land, continued to develop alongside more extensive British control in
cities such as Jos and in other northern states. 129 The British expanded
the legal authority of the Native Authorities to control the use and
disposition of land in 1945.13° This ordinance,
[C]onfers on Native Authorities more extensive powers than they have in any
other British dependency. They may make rules for the control of alienation
and mortgaging, for prescribing that purchase at sale shall be subject to their
approval, for regulating
the allocation of 'communal or family land' and for
131
controlling its use.

Thus, just as they did during the pre-colonial era, local Nigerian
authorities exercised extensive legal control over land resources under
British rule. Finally, following independence in 1960, the regional
government of Northern Nigeria enacted the Land Tenure Law. The
Land Tenure Law declares:
... [T]he whole of the lands of Northern Nigeria, whether occupied or
unoccupied, are hereby declared to be natives lands.... All native lands and all
rights over the same are hereby declared to be under the control and subject to
the disposition of the Minister and shall be held and administered for the use

126. Naturally, the British could accept or reject an application. See Ezeomah, supra
note 83, at 2.
127. The Lands and Native Rights Ordinance limited the right to acquire rights in
land to "natives" only. Thus, non-natives, people moving from one part of Nigeria to
another, or immigrants, could not acquire rights to land under this statute. See Adedipe
et al., supranote 46, at 4.
128. HALEY, supra note 41, at 452-54.
129. Id. at 789.
130. Id. at 790.
131. Id.
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and common benefit of the natives, and no title to occupation and use of any
13
such lands by a non-native shall be valid without the consent of the Minister. 2

This law extended the system created by the Land and Native Rights
Ordinance of 1916. Further, it created formal restrictions for landholding
rights by non-northerners. 133 Under the 1963 Land Tenure Law, rights
of occupancy could be held for an indefinite term. However such rights
were often specified on the "Form of Application" as valid for 99 years
on residential plots, 40 years for non-northern Nigerians on residential
plots, and a sliding scale of up to 99 years for industrial plots. 134 In
northern Nigeria, land was held by occupancy permits throughout the
1960s and 1970s. In the 1970s, farmers located on the outskirts of cities
often had their permits revoked, and land was taken and redistributed for
urban development. It appears that only minimal compensation was
paid for these takings, leading to additional conflict over land. 135 These
conflicts and concerns over the alleged speculation in land set the stage
for the next major development in the property rights regime in Plateau
State: the Land Use Act of 1978.
C. The Land Use Act of 1978
The Land Use Act (LUA) was issued by the military government of
Olusegun Obasanjo on March 29, 1978.136 The law nationalized all land
in Nigeria. At the time it went into effect, this law extinguished all existing
137
rights to use and occupy land, including rights held by custom.
Citizens were required to apply to the government for certificates of
occupancy, which were either statutory or customary, in order to make
claims on land or, more significantly, to transfer rights in land. The law
land
transferred primary responsibility for the management of communal
38
from the hands of chiefs, or emirs, to government officials.'

132.
Land Tenure Law, (1963) Cap. 59, §§ 4-6 (Nigeria).
133.
Nafziger, supra note 46, at 177; see also C.M. McDowell, Interpretationof the
Land Tenure Law, 14 J. OF AFR. L. 135, 155 (1970).
134. See McDowell, supra note 133, at 163.
Nafziger, supra note 46, at 177.
135.
136. See Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. Revised Edition (1990), available at
http://www.nigeria-law.org/LFNMainPage.htm.
137. See Bola Fajemirokun, Land and Resource Rights: Issues of Public Participation
and Access to Land in Nigeria, AFR. CTR. FOR TECH. STuDIEs, Mar. 25, 2002, http://www.
acts.or.ke/paplrr/docs/SRCPAPLRR-Bolaspr.pdf.

138.

Adedipe et al., supra note 46, at 4.

President Obasanjo stated that one reason for enacting the statute was
the "limiting, inhibiting and divisive nature of land tenure in the
country."' 139 The statute was designed to curb land speculation and
real estate price increases, to open access to land for both private and
public use, and to promote tenure security. 140 The Land Use Act was
offered as an attempt to rationalize a complex set of customary, common
law, and statutory provisions dealing with land in Nigeria, thereby
creating a uniform legal environment.
As noted earlier, the LUA vests control over land in State Governors,
who have a fiduciary responsibility to hold the land in trust for the use
and benefit of the citizens of Nigeria. In the 1989 case of Makanjuola v.
Balogun, the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that the effect of the LUA is
to vest absolute ownership of land in each state in the hands of the State
Governor.14 1 Under the statute, State Governors may issue certificates
of occupancy for land in both urban and non-urban areas. 142 Local
government officials may only issue certificates for customary rights of
occupancy in rural areas. State Governors decide which areas are urban
and which are non-urban, and thus maintain significant power over landallocation decisions.
State Governors are aided by Land Use and Allocation Committees
that advise them on land-management issues in urban areas and issues
related to resettlement and to the revocation of rights to serve public
need. Land Use and Allocation Committees are the "courts of first
instance" for resolving disputes related to certificate awards and to the
payment of compensation for land that is improved or taken for public
use.14 3 Appeals from committees are taken to officials at the Ministry
of Justice and then to the formal court system. 44 Land Allocation and

139. Fajemirokun, supra note 137, at 1.
140. Id.
141. Id.at 7 (citing the Supreme Court).
142. The purchaser of the right to occupy land presents a receipt for the sale of this
right to the local government chairman. If approved by this official, the purchaser next
applies to the land allocation committee. If approved at this stage, the state governor
will issue a statutory certificate of occupancy which constitutes a 99-year lease. See
Anna Knox, Nigeria Country Profile, in 130 COUNTRY PROFILES OF LAND TENURE:
AFRICA, 1996, 110, 113 (Land Tenure Ctr., Univ. of Wis.-Madison, 1998).
143. Fajemirokun, supra note 137, at 4; see also Williams, supra note 88, at 603-05
(Williams notes that at least some of these committees were seriously comprised during
the era of civilian rule in the late 70s, early 1980s ("their non-partisan was thoroughly
violated") and so were viewed as deeply biased towards the government. As a result,
some committees were disbanded and replaced by ad hoc committees appointed by
military leaders. This situation may have improved since the end of military rule, but
this is not known.).
144. Williams, supra note 88, at 604.
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Advisory Committees work with the local governments on similar
issues. 145
146
A statutory certificate of occupancy is typically issued for 99 years.
The certificate acts as a kind of lease agreement between the government
(the lessee) and the certificate holder (the lessor). Before the right is
granted, the state determines the amount of "rent" to be paid by the certificate
holder. 147 Because statutory rights trump customary rights, 148 local
governments may grant customary rights of occupancy only if there are
no competing statutory rights.
A statutory certificate of occupancy confers on the certificate holder a
set of rights, including the right to occupy, use, and improve the
property. This bundle is clearly thinner than that of a fee simple owner
under Anglo-American law. For example, the certificate holder cannot
149
sell, gift, or sublet land without the consent of the State Governor.
However, bequests of rights held under statutory and customary
certificates of occupancy are managed by customary-law principles, not
by statutory principles. 5 0
Under the customary land-tenure system, the chief, oba, headman, or
emir all held significant power. 5 ' In some cases chiefs and emirs
abused their powers, allocating land to favorites, limiting access 1to
52
strangers, and requiring payoffs to permit land transactions to occur.
During the colonial period, the power that some chiefs and emirs held
over land allocation ebbed as population growth increased the use of
private sales of land. 53 The Land Use Decree furthered this process,
removing from traditional leaders their power to distribute a valuable
resource-land-and with it, the income they garnered from land
transactions. 154 Donald C. Williams argues: "The Land Use Decree... was
145. Id. at 591.
146. Knox, supra note 142, at 113.
147. Adedipe et al., supra note 46, at 4.
148. Id.
149. Fajemirokun, supranote 137, at 3.
150. Adedipe et al., supra note 46, at 4.
151. Id. at3.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 5 (Adedipe et al. note, "Even prior to the Land Use Act, the old notions
of royal estates or stool land had been extensively eroded. Consequently, the political
and cultural power inherent in the exercise of land allocation by traditional rulers was
being undermined.").
154. Williams, supra note 88, at 587 (noting that, "Land reforms often signify one
element of a larger trend involving expansion of the state at the expense of other forms
of societal authority. As such, they represent the frontier of a widening struggle over

designed to pose a direct challenge to alternative sources of societal
authority by relegating all private transactions in land to government
agencies."' 5 5
The Land Use Act shifts the power to allocate land away from traditional
leaders to government officials. At the same time, those individuals who
held substantial local knowledge of the land, its traditional allocations
and uses are no longer called on to make allocation decisions. Instead,
individuals who may have little personal knowledge of the specifics of
land holding and land use are called upon to decide who has which
rights. Severing the link between the local knowledge and allocation
and use decisions is especially problematic in areas where customary
law is widespread, because customary law depends upon the memory of
local leaders. Written land records are limited in Nigeria. Local leaders
reach decisions based on their intimate knowledge of individuals and
their needs.' 56 Given the paucity of written records, government officials are
unlikely to have either this intimate knowledge or a reasonable substitute.
By placing the power to allocate land rights in the hands of
politicians-state governors-and, in turn, Land Use Allocation Committees
and Land Allocation and Advisory Committees, the LUA has created a
system in which government officials enjoy huge bargaining power
advantages in issuing certificates or allowing a transfer or sale to take
place.' 57 Quoting an article entitled "Establishing a Business in Nigeria"
Williams observes:
With the arbitrary powers given to the Governor of the state as regards the
issuance of a C of 0 [certificate of occupancy], and coupled with the ensuing
bureaucratic red-tapism, it is almost easier to pass a camel through a needle's
eye than to get this certificate. In the case of transfer of land, where the
Governor's consent is required before such transfer (be it temporary or
permanent) can be effected, the consent is usually 158
withheld until some
exorbitant and ridiculous transfer fee (consent fee) is paid.

legitimacy and control between 'state' and 'society'..."); see also, Adedipe et al., supra
note 46, at 5 (who write, "Furthermore, it appears that by nationalizing land in the country, the
very fabric upon which traditional customs and practices were woven has been threatened.").
155. Williams, supra note 88, at 587.
156. This is not to imply that decision making by local leaders was perfect, but
rather, it is to emphasize the important role that local knowledge of social norms and
customs related to property rights played with this particular group.
157. "Rather than curtail land speculation, as was intended, the Land Use Decree
opened the door for land to be acquired by government officials and used for political
patronage. This is reinforced by the fact that members of the land use and allocation
committee are appointed by the governor and the fact that the governor has discretion
over rent charges." See Knox, supra note 142, at I11.
158. Williams, supra note 88, at 592.
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These same government officials can reward favorites with certificates
of occupancy. 15 9 Cronies, family members, and politically well-connected
individuals have much less difficulty obtaining certificates than do
poorer, unconnected, and less well-educated citizens of Nigeria.' 60 In a
study of the effects of the Land Use Decree, Peter Koehn maintains:
urban
"State government officials have effectively barred the rural and
161
occupancy.'
of
rights
statutory
of
types
all
from
classes
laboring
The Land Use Act suffers from other shortcomings. Due to the high
level of corruption in the public sector, individuals distrust the Nigerian
bureaucracy. 162 Because of their suspicion of public officials, many people
avoid seeking certificates, since the issuance of the certificates requires
proof of property tax payment for the preceding three years. 163 This
requirement apparently leads officials to demand bribes before they
declare tax records "clear."' 64 Such corruption obviously increases the
costliness of the process.

159. Fajemirokun, supra note 137, at 5 (stating, "[T]he vesting of land in State
Governors has created powerful systems of authority and political patronage. . . those
with access to the corridors of power are able to easily acquire land and sometimes
through the dispossession of other poorer groups.").
160. Williams, supra note 88, at 598 (observing that, "A growing body of evidence
seems to suggest that the benefits of Nigeria's land development and plot allocation
schemes are chronically imbalanced. Past studies of improprieties suggest that those with
wealth and close connections to State Governments are overwhelmingly beneficiaries of
these programmes."); see also CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 17
(stating, "All things equal, those interest groups with greater wealth, size, and homogeneity
will have more resources to influence politicians regarding the assignment of property
rights." Plateau state is composed of many small groups, but is increasingly populated
by members of larger, politically powerful ethnic groups: Hausa and Fulani in particular.).
161. Peter Koehn, PoliticalAccess and CapitalAccumulation: An Analysis of State
Land Allocation Processesand Beneficiariesin Nigeria, 12 AFR. DEV. 163, 179 (1987).
162. See generally Abdullahi, supra note 21, at 225 (discussing public and government
officials' criticism of the Senate's proposed legislation to weaken the Independent Corrupt
Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission).
163. Williams states:
[A]ll claims on land must be supported by property tax receipts from three
preceeding years, or evidence of tax clearance under the terms of the pay-asyou-earn system. Since many landlords have consistently evaded the payment
of taxes on rented properties, there is a real possibility that processing a certificate
of occupancy could lead to criminal prosecution. Those who cannot avoid the
necessity of obtaining such a document have to go to great lengths to pay out
the necessary bribes for securing a tax clearance certificate from the State's
revenue office.
Williams, supra note 88, at 592.
164. Id.

Further, the Land Use Act limits the size of land one may own,
depending on whether it is urban or rural and whether one is a farmer or
herder. 165 Such a one-size-fits-all (or almost all) approach to land use
ignores the differing abilities of individuals to successfully manage land.
This approach is reminiscent of the United States government's approach to
settling the American west in the 19th century, in which 160 acre plots
of land were parceled, and settlers were forced to live within the
constraints of this arbitrary limit.166 In Nigeria, the effects of the Land
Use Act have been characterized this way: "The Land Use Act has
arguably exacerbated the stress on land caused by population increase,
167
and increased the risk of long-term soil and environmental degradation."'
The Land Use Act extinguishes rights in undeveloped urban land over
half a hectare and limits the ability of individuals to possess multiple
plots of developed land.' 68 It has been noted that valuable property is
more likely to be registered than less valuable land, presumably because
of registration exceed the costs of operating
the perceived benefits
69
1
system.
the
within
The Nigerian system for registering land is inefficient, both because it
is subject to rent seeking, and because it is not capable of handling
registrations efficiently due to personnel shortages, poor training, and
lack of equipment.1 70 Registry offices often lack maps and other evidence
of property boundaries. For these reasons, they may have difficulty
the costs associated
validating evidence provided by claimants. Over time,
7
with registering property have risen significantly.' '
The many problems associated with the Land Use Act suggest that de
facto property rights are quite insecure-unless, perhaps, one has useful
political connections. As a result of these limitations, individuals often skirt
165. Williams states,
Statutory rights of occupancy in urban areas were strictly limited to 0.5 hectare
of 'undeveloped' land, while the number of 'developed' plots was subject to
the determination of the State Governor's Office. Customary rights of occupancy
were to be confined exclusively to rural areas, where plots were permitted to
be as large as 500 hectares of farmland or 5,000 hectares for grazing.
Williams, supra note 88, at 596.
166. Douglas W. Allen, Homesteading and Property Rights: Or, "How the West
was Really Won", in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 21, 26-29 (Terry

L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1994).
167. Adedipe et al., supra note 46, at 10.
168. Land Use Act, supra note 15, § 10.
169. See Williams, supra note 88, at 593.
170. Id. at 590.
171. Id. at 592 (noting that, "In Oyo State, a revision of filing fees in 1984 by
the Governor increased the cost of this procedure (filing for a certificate of occupancy) by 500
per cent from Nigerian 50 to 250."). Fajemirokun, supra note 137, at 5 (observing that,
"It is also noteworthy that the transaction costs for obtaining certificates of
occupancy have become important sources of government revenues.").
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the dejure land law: "The tedious legal and bureaucratic formalities required
for allocation of land in accordance with the Act have resulted inthreatening
the very survival and efficacy of the Act. It is thus open knowledge that
means of72circumventing the spirit and letter of the Act are being actively
sought."1

As things currently stand in Plateau, a combination of barriers is
working to block the development of a smoothly functioning, legal
real-property market. These myriad problems lead citizens to circumvent
the strictures of the Act. Further, the perceived injustices of the system,
coupled with ineffective enforcement by the state, may lead to a more
serious problem: citizens taking "justice" into their own hands and
pursuing a strategy of
73 violence over cooperative trading, the past
1
norm.
property-rights
III. BLOCKING THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY NORMS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

With this background in mind, we can consider why violent conflict
over property is plaguing Plateau State. As we have seen, a number of
conflicts in Plateau involve Christian farmers and Muslim herders competing
for fertile land. Rising population, increasing heterogeneity, and ineffective
government enforcement combine to increase the costs associated with
negotiating property rights claims. 174 It appears that existing methods for
managing conflict have failed: neither customary norms nor legislative
mechanisms are sufficient to stop violent conflict. A close examination
of the customary legal environment and the Land Use Act reveals that a
gap likely exists between the two. 175 This gap may help explain why people
in Plateau have turned to violence to solve property-rights disputes.
172. Adedipe et al., supra note 46, at 10. An example of "skirting" is the following:
Those who do choose to register any sale often take advantage of prevailing
inadequacies in the administrative process. After payment is made for a plot of
land, it is quite common to locate a lawyer for what can only be described as
the appropriate 'doctoring' of documents, mainly in order to convey the
impression that the purchase was made prior to 29 March 1978, when such
unregulated sales were still legal . . .even when fraud is detected, the
documents are not always rejected. Often such discrepancies simply provide
one more avenue for bribery.
Williams, supra note 88, at 594.
173. See Anderson & McChesney, supranote 25, at 46-48.
174. See id. at 49-52.
175. Discussing evolving property rights for agricultural land in Thailand, Gershon
Feder and David Feeny write: "If private property rights are not viewed as legitimate or

Evidence indicates that Plateau was settled by many small ethnic
groups who lived in relative isolation due to the geography of the region
and group preference. 176 These groups developed a rich customary law
with a wide-ranging set of property rights and contracting norms that
allowed them to trade rights internally, and also provided mechanisms
for trading rights with strangers. Until recently, relatively peaceful trading
of property rights predominated,
and violence was seldom used to settle
77
property-rights claims.
The variety of land rights and contracting vehicles is striking, though
by no means uncommon in communal property regimes. 78 This variety
indicates a rich institutional response to the problem of internalizing
externalities. 1 79 Despite the imposition of legislation by both the British
and post-colonial governments that was designed to change the propertyrights environment, the traditional communal property regime has persevered.
The persistence of this system may evidence the importance of protecting
family-based relationships, of providing incentives to cooperate and
coordinate production activities in a useful manner, and of effectively
allocating resources. 180 Indigenous dispute resolution--which was accessible,
relatively inexpensive, and largely transparent-may also have helped to
spread information, promote
cooperation, and lessen conflict within and
8
among ethnic groups.' '
There is evidence from Plateau that rights to land existed on a continuum,
from traditional communal property rights to tenure rights that closely
resembled freehold. Not surprisingly, more extensive rights existed in
those areas where investment in land was high, as was the case, for
example, with the Kofyars, who invested8heavily
in building terraces and
2
in fertilizing their relatively scarce land. 1
The thickness of the property-rights bundle individuals held under
customary law meant that individuals had increased opportunities to
trade these rights and, in turn, to benefit from expanded trading
are not enforced adequately, de jure private property becomes de facto open access." See
Feder & Feeny, supra note 22, at 137 (Discussing that open access resources, owned by
no one, are oftentimes subject to destructive competition that results in the now famous
"tragedy of the commons." This may well be an important part of the problem in Plateau.).
176. See discussion supra pp. 21-22.
177. See discussion infra at 43.
178. See generally ELrNOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990) (discussing
varied solutions to the problem of managing common property).
179. There is evidence that throughout Nigeria, the customary legal environment
provided a great variety of contracting vehicles, private bargaining mechanisms, related
to land tenure. See generally T. OLAWALE ELIAS, NIGERIAN LAND LAW AND CUSTOM (3rd
ed. rev. 1962) [hereinafter NIGERIAN LAND LAW].
180. COOTER, supra note 17, at 4.
181. See BOHANNAN, supra note 52.
182. See NETrNG, supra note 42, at 158-68.
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opportunities, so long as the rights were enforced. To the extent that
individuals hold thicker, as opposed to thinner, bundles of property
rights, they have increased opportunities to take advantage of dispersed

local knowledge, pursue entrepreneurial opportunities, and gain from
trade. A thicker bundle may indicate additional flexibility to experiment
with different approaches to solving allocation and use problems. In
their isolated environment, the inhabitants of Plateau seem to have
benefited from the broad right to lend, pledge, use, and borrow land.
The rich customary legal environment also indicates that the law was
relatively elastic, responding to changing needs over time through an
evolutionary process.183 While communal property remained the norm
in Plateau State, there was movement over time towards more
individualized tenure over land. 184 Where the demand for land increases,
either because of changes in population or technology, one would expect
a community to expend more resources defining property rights and to
move from communal ownership toward more individualized tenure,
either in the form of sale or unredeemed pledges.' 85 Such a move is one
way for previously homogeneous communities to deal with the costs of
information asymmetries that arise as the network of contacts and
potential trading partners increase.1 86 In Plateau, individuals recognized
the benefits to be gained from the greater specification of property
rights.'

87

These unknown entrepreneurs "created" a new right: the right to

183. See David E. Ault & Gilbert Rutman, The Development ofIndividual Rights to
Property in TribalAfrica, 22 J.L. & EcON. 171 (1979).
184. See discussionsupra pp. 18-19; see also Demsetz, supra note 14, at 350. Demsetz
states:
I do not mean to assert or to deny that the adjustments in property rights which
take place need be the result of a conscious endeavor to cope with new
externality problems. These adjustments have arisen in Western societies
largely as a result of gradual changes in social mores and in common law
precedents.
Id. We see evidence of a gradual shift in social mores, in favor of some individualization
of tenure, in Nigeria also.
185. See Demsetz, supra note 14, at 356; CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra
note 23, at 16-17.
186. Feder & Feeny, supra note 22, at 140.
187. Martin Chanock, A PeculiarSharpness: An Essay on Property in the History
of Customary Law in ColonialAfrica, 32 J. OF AFR. HIST. 65, 72-73 (1991) ("But one of
the aspects of pressure on land, taking the area as a whole, was the growth of cash
cropping. Those who were doing well wanted more land and were prepared to innovate
with forms of tenure. Their response to scarcity was far from traditionalist.").

sell property. 88 By accommodating this entrepreneurial activity, the
indigenous legal system expanded options for allocating property rights.
The limited evidence that exists about the subject of land sales
indicates that the indigenous legal system evolved in response to a changing
environment. 89 The use of the unredeemed pledge, for example,
demonstrates a shift towards increased individualization of tenure,
and hence, an evolution of traditional communal-property norms. A
movement towards greater individualization of land-tenure rights will
the rights
occur when the marginal benefits of creating and enforcing
90
exceed the marginal costs associated with the new rights.'
In Plateau, there is evidence that such a process took place in mid-20th
century. In the case of the Kofyar people, Netting notes that:
The Kofyar insist that every square inch of arable soil, both village and bush,
has an owner, a single person to whom the land belongs and who alone may
decide on its use. This is probably a direct outgrowth of intensive farming.
Wherever land can be made to produce heavily and continuously over
191 a long
period of time, it increases in value to both the occupant and his heirs.

With the Kofyar, both factors may have been at work, resulting in a
distinctive institutional response to the issue of land allocation.
Another interesting example of the flexibility of the customary legal
environment in Plateau State-one that promoted homogeneity and its
attendant benefits by aligning property-rights expectations-was the
92
provision for incorporating, or adopting, "strangers" into kinship groups.'
The mechanism of allocating property to strangers in perpetuity was, in
and thereby managing
essence, a method for inducing homogeneity
93
problems associated with heterogeneity. 1
188.
& PETER

See Anderson & Hill, supra note 14, at 119-22; see also TERRY L. ANDERSON
J. HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER 35

(2004).
189. Ault & Rutman, supra note 183, at 171. Ault & Rutman states:
tribal institutions governing land use and occupation respond to changes in
economic conditions. As population pressure or the importance of commercial
agriculture increases, changes in the land tenure system should result in a
system that defines the individual rights to the land more clearly. As land
becomes scarce in a communal system, private and social benefits will diverge
unless the individual bears the full costs of his actions.
Id.
190. Anderson & Hill, supra note 14, at 119.
191. NETTING,supra note 42, at 159.
192. NIGERIAN LAND LAW, supra note 179, at 107-09. There were a number of
other methods, under African customary law, to facilitate the incorporation of strangers
into a group. Discussing the ways in which group members acted to bring strangers
within the fold of the group, Elias notes, "Rules of hospitality, the protection of friends,
inter-marriage, and inter-tribal associations, all of which generally make it possible for
members of the group to plead the strangers' cause in a vicarious capacity." ELIAS,
supra note 46, at 106.
193. For example, the GAZETTEER notes:
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The process typically began whenever a stranger allied him or herself
with a member of the community and lived with that member's family,
gradually establishing a good reputation. 194 T.O. Elias notes: "The practice
has almost always been that strangers would attach themselves to an
influential person with whose family they would normally have been
lodging for some period prior to a formal request being made on their
behalf by their host."' 95 During this period the stranger absorbed the norms
and expectations of the adoptive group. 196 The adoptive family monitored
this process to ensure that the stranger was trustworthy and otherwise a
good "fit" for the group. 197 When the adoptive family was assured this
was the case, the head of the family would intercede on the stranger's
behalf and ask for land, assuming underutilized land was available.
Presumably, the adoptive family had its own reputation on the line in
such a process, and so it monitored strangers with special care. The
chief typically consented to an application for land ownership if:
(1) the stranger ...[was] of good report, (2) he ...[was] ready and willing to
obey the accepted social norms of the adoptive group and (3) he.. .[had] respect
for and loyalty to the head chief as well as the elders of the community. Land
so granted is held by strangers in perpetuity in exactly the same way and subject
to the like conditions of customary tenure
as bind the members of the owner198
occupiers themselves (emphasis added).

This process turned the stranger into a quasi-family member and
encouraged the adopted person to align his or her expectations regarding

Land for farming may be obtained by a stranger in East Mama on approaching
the village-head and elders and no rent or payment is asked. In Kwarra and the
Northern Mama villages a stranger, as a rule, is taken into some one's house
and then he shares the farm land of that householder.
GAZETTEER, supra note 51, at 279.
194. NIGERIAN LAND LAW, supra note 179, at 111.

195. Id.
196. This process would develop a sense of reciprocal duties and rights within the
group. As Bruce Benson, notes, "Reciprocities are the basic source both of the recognition of
duty to obey law and of law enforcement in a customary law system. That is, individuals
must "exchange" recognition of certain behavioral rules for their mutual benefit."
BRUCE BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW 12 (1990).

197. Nobel Laureate George Stigler says that information [transaction] costs
represent, "the costs of transportation from ignorance to omniscience; and seldom can a
trader afford to take the entire trip." The stranger mechanism did not take adoptive
families to omniscience, but moved them a good way from ignorance towards more
complete knowledge of the stranger. George Stigler, Imperfections in the capitalmarket,
73 J. OF POL. ECON. 287, 291 (1967).

198.

NIGERIAN LAND LAW,supra note 179, at 111.

the use and transfer of property with those of the group. 199 One effect
was to lower the transactional costs associated with group coordination,
cooperation, resource allocation, and use. Another effect was to reduce
future costs associated with monitoring and enforcing obligations.
This mechanism reduced the transactional costs associated with
dealing with heterogeneous agents.200 When th
the ability to engage in
impersonal exchange was limited, this mechanism personalized
property-rights trading.20 ' While the process was costly and slow, it was
a step in the evolutionary process from personal to impersonal exchange.
The customary-law principle for dealing with strangers can thus be seen
as a way for outsiders to develop a reputation for trustworthiness
within an unfamiliar group. This feature of customary African law,
while cumbersome, may have worked to solve the problem of increased
20 2
heterogeneity while ensuring better use of underutilized resources.
Preserving or inducing homogeneity may have been an important
strategy for these groups for several reasons. First, homogeneous groups
can coordinate production and other activities in a less costly manner
than heterogeneous groups.2 03 For farmers working with rather primitive,

labor-intensive technology, low-cost coordination is valuable.

Homogeneous

groups are able to cooperate at a lower cost than heterogeneous groups. 205

Individuals within the group are likely to have repeated interactions with
other group members. They may generate higher levels of goodwill and
trust in each other.20 6

199. Id. at 109.
200. Jtdrg Niehans, Transaction Costs, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 676, 676 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, & Peter Newman eds., 1987)
(stating, "Transaction costs arise from the transfer of ownership or, more generally, of
property rights. They are a concomitant of decentralized ownership rights, private property
and exchange."); see generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, (1960).
201. See generally Douglass C. North, Economic Performance through Time,
Nobel Prize Lecture, (Dec. 9, 1993), available at http://nobelprize.org/economics/
laureates/1993/north-lecture.html; DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). Kevin A. McCabe, Reciprocity and
Social Order: What do experiments tell us about the failure of economic growth?, in
FORUM SERIES ON THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH

(Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason Univ. 2003), available at http://www.mercatus.org/
pdf/materials/274.pdf.
202. For a discussion of the effects of heterogeneity on property-rights contracting,
see CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 22-23.
203. COOTER, supra note 17, at 3-4.
204. NETTING, supra note 42, at 178-80 (on how community helped each other).
205. Libecap, supranote 20, at 148-49.
206. See Kevin A. McCabe & Vernon L. Smith, Goodwill Accounting in Economic
Exchange, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 319, 319-40 (G. Gigerenzer
& R. Selten eds., 2001).
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Transactional costs incurred by homogeneous groups are low compared
to those incurred by heterogeneous groups, because homogeneous
groups can more effectively rely on social norms to promote compliance.2 °7
Higher cooperation levels mean that fewer resources are spent defining,
monitoring, and enforcing property rights. In Plateau, studies of the 1930s
and 1960s suggest that violent conflict over property was relatively
rare. 20 8 Of particular interest are Robert Netting's observations of the
relationship between the Kofyar and Fulani herdsmen in the 1960s:
The pastoral Fulani did not have access to Plateau pastures until after British
pacification and the eradication of the tsetse fly. Several households now move up
and down the Kofyar escarpment according to the season, and some others have
settled in the lowlands. Their milk products find little market among the beerdrinking Kofyar, but individuals compete in offering money and services to
induce Fulani to camp on and thus manure their fields. With the exception of
venturing freely to new farms on the plain and markets within a twenty-mile
radius, Kofyar show little change in their tolerant relations with neighboring
groups. Few of the strangers in their territory enter into direct competition with
the Kofyar, and those who do, such as the
Tiv filtering north from the Benue,
209
are merely regarded with mild suspicion.

As Libecap notes, however, when groups become heterogeneous and
have a limited history of interaction, they may need to turn to more
formalized government institutions to define and enforce land rights.2 10
The lengthy and costly process for inducing homogeneity through
adoption may be contrasted with the short-term loan, which serves as a

207. Libecap, supra note 20, at 144-45. See also, Niehans, supra note 200, at 678
(stating, "With increasing complexity, transaction costs tend to increase very rapidly ... This
is the basic reason for the emergence of market economies consisting of a network of
bilateral exchanges. Politics may be interpreted as the arena in which multilateral
transactions are typically made.").
208. See discussion supra pp. 24-25; Libecap, supra note 20. Netting notes that,
With land scarcity and individual tenure, and lacking any sort of survey or written
records, it is obvious that the Kofyar should have land disputes ... Relatively
few disputes concerning land come before the courts, whether clam or village
moots or the Native Authority courts officially administering customary law.
In comparison with arguments over women, divorce, and the repayment of
bride price, land cases make up less than 5 percent of the disputes heard before
NA courts. My impression is that a good many of the disputes over land
ownership may be settled by informal hearings in a local clan segment or a
village.
NETTING, supra note 42, at 172.
209. NETTING, supra note 42, at 53.
210. Libecap, supra note 20, at 145; see also Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick & Rajendra
Pradhan, Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights, at 5, (CAPRi, Int'l Food Pol'y
Res. Inst., Working Paper No. 22, 2002), http://www.capri.cgiar.org/wp/capriwp22.asp.

means for allowing individuals outside the group limited access to
valuable resources. 211 Compared with long-term loans or sales of real
property, the short-term loan may also have lower transactional costs,
particularly when resources are relatively abundant. The reason is that
less is at stake because of the shorter term of the contract. Parties to a
short-term contract, therefore, likely spend fewer resources outlining
rights and obligations. Monitoring costs also are correspondingly lower,
as are the corresponding transactional costs. Thus, in cases where problems
of heterogeneity cannot easily be overcome-such as most trades
between animists and Muslims, Christians and Muslims, or Fulanis and
Taroks-the short-term loan under customary land law is a cost-effective
contracting mechanism for trading property rights and reallocating a
resource. 212
This brings us to the recent conflict in Plateau State. In Plateau,
population size and heterogeneity are increasing.2 13 An increase in
population places additional demands on the land resources, thereby
raising its value. At the same time, increased heterogeneity leads to higher
transactional costs when bargaining for land rights. In the absence of
a viable enforcement mechanism, these costs escalate rapidly. The
combination of poorly enforced rights, increased competition, and the
increased heterogeneity of actors might lead to fewer property-rights
trades and more violence.214
As previously discussed, customary land law provided two methods
for dealing with heterogeneous actors: a) adoption; or b) the short-term
loan. Until recently, herders used the short-term loan of land to acquire
rights to graze and water livestock.2 15 Such loans presented "no permanent
loss of land to the customary owners. 2 16 These loans provided benefits
to both parties to the transaction: farmers had fields of stubble grazed
and manured, while herders gained access to grazing grounds not
otherwise open to them. As one commentator remarks: "In the past 60
to 70 years relationships between herding and farming groups in the use
'217
of land for grazing and cultivation were generally friendly.
211. This was a common way for herders to acquire temporary use of land as the
moved from one location to another, grazing their animals. See Ezeomah, supra note 83,
at 3.
212. See GAZETTEER, supra note 51, at 114 (note however, that loans do generate
disputes. The GAZETrEER comments that while there were few disputes over property in
the 1930s, those that did come to the attention of this colonial authority typically
involved loans or leases).
213. See Conflict in northern Nigeria more about landand livelihood than religion,
supra note 12.
214. See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 25, at 49-52.
215. See Ezeomah, supra note 83, at 3.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 5.
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As the desert spreads southward, limiting grazing and watering
opportunities, herders from the north are moving into Plateau, presumably
seeking more permanent rights to such resources.2t 8 At the same time,
as the population of settled farmers increases, there is an increase in the
demand for farmland. 21 9 The two demands clash. Under customary law,
these heterogeneous parties were able to use the short-term loan to
allocate grazing and watering rights. However, this kind of temporary
solution might no longer be workable if the rising value of property
gives short-term lessees incentives to breach the contract and remain on
the land.
In such situations, the customary-law mechanism of "adopting" strangers
should come into play. However, this customary mechanism, which
worked effectively to incorporate small numbers of strangers, might
simply be too cumbersome and too slow to incorporate larger groups of
strangers. As a result, a movement towards the increased individualization
of tenure is expected. In other words, customary law is expected to adapt
and allow for increased use of the sale of property.
However, this movement is blocked by the Land Use Act, which
promotes tenure insecurity. 220 As the value of land increases, people
holding insecure property rights will seek ways to secure their rights.
Indeed, under the Land Use Act, herders have special incentive to assert
claims to property, because the statute allows them to seek rights to as
many as 5,000 hectares of land, while farmers may only seek a
maximum of 500 acres. 221 Thus, herders have an opportunity to capture

218. One view states that,
Plateau State has an estimated cattle population of 1.07 million in the hands of
Fulani nomads .... The rapid growth of cattle population on the Jos Plateau has
resulted in over-grazing and very stiff competition for land between sedentary
farmers and nomadic Fulanis which is often expressed in violent clashes
between the two groups.
Natural Resources and Development-Plateau State, ONLINE NIGERIA, MAR. 3, 2003,

http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/Plateauadv.asp?blurb=464.
219. In 1978 the number of hectares in crop cultivation in Plateau was 883,221. By
1987 the number had increased to 1,099,842, which represents a 24.5% increase. See
DEP'T OF PLANNING, PLATEAU STATE STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK (Nig.), table 15 at 19
(1981-1987).
220. Fajemirokun, supra note 137, at 6; see also Knox, supra note 142, at 110
(noting, "The legislation [the Land Use Decree] has been fraught with problems, not the
least of which has been heightened tenure insecurity emanating from the government's
liberal use of its compulsory acquisition right and general public confusion over the
law's provisions.").
221.
Land Use Act, supranote 15, § 6(2).

a large share of the rents associated with rising property value in the
Plateau area.
The Land Use Act might also limit opportunities for cooperative
indigenous dispute resolution. Previous institutional arrangements gave
local leaders a significant voice in dispute resolution over property
rights. The process created by the LUA envisions a much more limited
role for such leaders, that of providing evidentiary material. Although
this role is useful, it means that current decision makers are not accountable
to the community in the way local leaders were. Individuals may also
encounter problems negotiating certificates of occupancy with government
officials, who have significant bargaining power vis-i-vis applicants, and
can thus hold out for bribes. If this hold-out problem is real, as Williams
argues, then renegotiations in response to changes in the environment
are also more costly and occur less frequently than under a customary
law regime.22 2
Government will normally provide increased clarification of property
rights and enforcement when property values rise and heterogeneity
increases.223 However, if government attempts to define and enforce
rights fail, then people will be forced to skirt formal de jure processes.
In Plateau, the rights of settled farmers and incoming herders are
insecure under the current amalgamation of customary law and land-use
legislation.22 4 As the value of the land around these groups rises, members
of each seek to capture the correspondingly high rents by excluding
members of the other. Corrupt government institutions provide no real
alternative conflict resolution, and the older customary system may be
unable to process this level of change.225 In such a situation, resorting to
violence may be less costly than negotiating a peaceful transfer of
property rights.22 6

222. Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan, supra note 210, at 15.
223. Libecap, supranote 20, at 144-45.
224. See Conflict in northern Nigeriamore about land and livelihood that religion,
supra note 12.
225. Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan note:
In some contexts of social and political change, legal pluralism [i.e., situations
in which various legal systems, such as statutory law, customary law, religious
law, and local norms, overlap] can increase uncertainty for local resource users.
This is especially seen when statutory law does not recognize customary rights,
and those with greater political connections, knowledge of state law, or access
to the courts uses (sic) state law to override customary rights, in order to
capture resources.
Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan, supra note 210, at 13.
226. See generally Anderson & McChesney, supra note 25; John Umbeck, Might
Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formationand Initial Distributionof Property Rights, 19
ECON. INQUIRY 38, 38-59 (1981).
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By formalizing and centralizing decision-making about land use and
land occupancy, the Nigerian government has blocked the evolutionary
development of customary land law. The Act replaces indigenous
dispute-resolution institutions with bureaucratized, corrupt government
institutions. Rather than rely on decentralized legal decision making, the
Land Use Act creates a formalized and centralized system that is
expensive for individuals to use. This system, therefore, reduces
experimentation in legal problem solving, and it leads to decreased
jurisdictional competition. The system is riddled with problems, including
the time-consuming nature of the process, costliness, corruption, favoritism,
and inaccessibility for citizens living in rural areas.
Legislation such as the Land Use Act is more rigid and less responsive to
community needs than customary law because it is removed from
individuals who hold dispersed local knowledge of each dispute and the
potential impacts of the judgments it imposes. By removing land-use
decision-making authority from local leaders who represent homogeneous
groups, the Land Use Act discourages these groups from developing
ways to communicate knowledge, coordinate activities, and cooperate.
The Land Use Act, in effect, promotes the heterogenization of relations.
The Act blocks the development of a land sales market, forcing
individuals to rely on government officials to allocate this resource.
This keeps property and land relations in a state of personal exchange,
but without the enforcement mechanisms that existed under customary
law. Thus, the Land Use Act fails to solve problems associated with
heterogeneous agents while at the same time outlawing the sale of land,
the contractual mechanism that is best suited for managing propertyrights relations among such individuals.22 7
The result is that the Land Use Act has increased transactional costs
compared to the customary system. No longer can individuals and
groups rely on social norms to ensure compliance with property rights.
Rather, individuals must rely on the state to define, monitor, and enforce
these rights. Significantly, however, the Nigerian state often fails in this
essential function:
In light of the pattern of violence in Plateau State over recent months, with each
community seeking to avenge attacks by their opponents, the latest outbreak
should have come as no surprise to federal and state authorities," said [Peter]
Takirambudde* ... 'Yet the Nigerian government took no action to preempt the
massacre. The government's neglect of the situation in Plateau over the last
227.

See generally COOTER, supra note 17, at 12.

three years has resulted in an endless cycle of revenge,' Takirambudde said.
'Not only have the police been unwilling or unable to stop the fighting, but the
government has not taken responsibility for finding a lasting solution to the
crisis. '228

*Executive Director, Human Rights Watch's Africa Division

In Nigeria, the government is considered to be highly corrupt, and state
officials often fail to enforce and protect property rights.22 The judiciary is
not considered to be impartial. 230 Because the public sector is so corrupt,
individuals must rely more heavily on personal exchange and personal
influence to accomplish their goals. Such reliance might be more
problematic in Nigeria, because the Land Use Act superseded customary
norms designed to smooth relations among individuals in dealings over
land. No longer are village headmen, chiefs, or obas able to facilitate
the incorporation of outsiders into the group or make land-use decisions
based on their local knowledge. At the same time, people do not have
reliable access to government decision makers. Thus, disputes over land
allocation and land use issues may be left to individuals to resolve, and
individuals may have to resort to violence to assert property claims.
With regard to land, the Land Use Act places primary responsibility
for managing land-allocation decisions with state governors. Yet, as
Transparency International's 2003 report on Nigeria states: "[A]lthough
Nigeria is a federation of states, there has been virtually no independent,
231
anti-corruption effort by any of the states or by local government.
This situation bodes especially ill for land issues.
Further, because they are viewed as corrupt, costly, distant, and less
transparent, government courts might be less accessible to Nigerians
than customary courts. Government courts are particularly difficult for the
poor and less well educated to negotiate. In a 2004 report on judicial
integrity in Nigeria, the United National Office on Drugs and Crimes says:
Significant differences were found regarding the experiences and perceptions of
respondents with different socio-economic and demographic characteristics. In
particular the less privileged, both in terms of monetary means and educational
background as well as the ethnic minorities tended to have worse experiences and
perceptions of the justice system. . . Further, the poor and uneducated were more
228. Nigeria: Prevent Further Bloodshed in Plateau State, supra note 6.
229. See Abdullahi, supra note 21.
230. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Global Program Against
Corruption, Assessment of Justice System Integrity and Capacityin three NigerianStates,
I(C)-D(5) (May 2004), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/comuption/ JusticeSectorAssessment_
2004.pdf (assessing the state of the judiciary and Nigerian court system and discussing,
among other issues, low levels of public trust in Nigeria's courts, a declining willingness on
the part of citizens to use the courts, a concern over a lack of judicial independence, concerns
over lengthy, slow and costly process, and concerns over corruption, especially among clerks
of courts); see also Abdullahi, supranote 21, at 227.
231. Abdullahi, supra note 21, at 226.
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likely to experience delays injustice delivery ... women, the poor as well as ethnic
minorities experienced and perceived lower quality of justice delivery.
. . ethnic
232
minorities as well as the poor tended to have less trust in judiciary.

As individuals face increasing conflict over land, they fall victim to a
system that exacts high costs for resolving land disputes. Indeed, the
system might well be perceived as so costly that individuals resort to
violence in order to lay effective de facto claims to land, an increasingly
valuable resource. 233

IV. CONCLUSION

At first glance the increased violence in Plateau State over propertyrights allocations is puzzling. Why, in the home of "Peace and Tourism,"
are thousands of people dying because of property disputes? The recognition
that changing conditions, both exogenous and endogenous, create
incentives that perhaps lead people to resort to violence rather than
peaceful trade helps to piece this puzzle together. A growing and
increasingly heterogeneous population is demanding access to ever
scarcer land. This rising demand raises land values. It is more costly for
the citizens of Plateau to peacefully trade these land rights because of the
increased transactional costs associated with greater heterogeneity and
with the institutional process created by the Land Use Act. These
problems, coupled with tenure insecurity and poor enforcement of rights,
lead to fewer instances of peaceful trading and to increased violence.
The Land Use Act significantly restricts individuals' ability to trade
property rights. Even if peaceful trade does take place, as it no doubt does,
the risk remains that such rights might be taken by predatory private or
public action, resulting in increased tenure insecurity. Not only is tenure
becoming increasingly insecure in Plateau, the state government is failing to
enforce rights and to manage violence associated with violations.
The result is that the Land Use Act has blocked legal evolution that
would normally allow for greater individualization of tenure rights in
Plateau State. People cannot buy and sell land in a decentralized market
place. They can only legally acquire and transfer rights through a deeply
corrupt political process. As land in Plateau increases in value because of
internal migrations and increasing population, citizens face extremely costly
processes for establishing rights in land. This author suggests that these
232.
233.

UNODC, supra note 230, at IV(A).
See Anderson & McChesney supranote 25, at 49-50.

high costs force individuals to forego the process established by the Land
Use Act, opting instead to establish rights by private force. Unless and until
the incentive structure for the transfer of land rights in Plateau (and
throughout Nigeria) is changed to promote peaceful transfer over violence,
the problems of Yelwa and Jos are likely to continue. Robert Cooter's
advice is apt as Nigerian leaders ponder how to return peace to Plateau:
Central authorities should aim for the modest goals of removing obstacles to
economic opportunity, rather than trying to dictate the pace and direction of
development . . . Uncertainty over property rights can only be removed
through the234evolution of customary law and the registration of customary
boundaries.

234.

COOTER, supra note 17, at 7.

